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 ABSTRACT 
Nonpoint-source pollution remains a troubling source of water quality problems despite decades 
of economics research on the matter. Among the chief difficulties for addressing the issue are the 
property rights assignments implicit in the current policy environment that favor agricultural 
nonpoint-source pollution, the unobservability of field-level emissions, and complex fate and 
transport relationships linking them to ambient water quality. Theoretical and practical 
considerations lead to the focus on observable abatement actions (conservation practices). 
Biophysical models are increasingly more capable of linking abatement actions to policy-
relevant water quality outcomes. If costs of abatement actions are known, finding the least-cost 
mix of abatement actions is possible, while incorporating the nonlinearity of the pollution 
process. When costs are not known or information is incomplete, regulators can rely on flexible 
incentive-based programs, but the design of such programs is complicated by the complexities of 
emission aggregation. In this work, we focus on the regulator capable of focusing on nonpoint-
source emitters. We address the design and performance of three practice-based approaches, 
ranging from the command-and-control approach mandating practices, to the more flexible 
performance standard approach where farmers are free to select the optimal mix of on-farm 
conservation practices, to a fully flexible approach where credits for conservation practices are 
freely tradable. We do so by utilizing the representation of the nonlinear emission aggregation 
(fate and transport) process (the Soil and Water Assessment Tool model), and consider cases 
ranging from the regulator having perfect information on the costs of conservation practices to 
no information at all. We show how workable programs utilizing the biophysical models and 
simulation-optimization approaches can be designed, and assess their performance relative to the 
efficient case. We find that flexible programs perform well both in terms of cost and water 
quality goals attainment. In particular, a trading program designed around an approximation of 
the nonlinear pollution process performs well, relative to first-best under no information on the 
cost of conservation practices.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Environmental and agricultural economists have been studying the design of efficient 
programs to address nonpoint-source (NPS) water pollution from agriculture for decades. Issues 
studied extensively include taxes, subsidies, and standards capable of achieving the first-best 
outcomes (Griffin and Bromley, 1982; Shortle et al., 1998), or as one would realistically expect 
from a workable policy, second-best outcomes (Shortle and Dunn, 1986; Shortle and Horan, 
2001). Much of this work has focused on the design of these programs within the context of the 
existing regulatory structure and its associated focus on the voluntary adoption of abatement 
actions from agriculture (Ribaudo, 2001). Within that property rights approach, researchers 
investigated the cost-effective design of subsidies to induce adoption (Shortle and Dunn, 1986; 
Braden et al., 1989; Wu and Babcock, 1996; Carpentier, Bosch, and Batie, 1998; Khanna et al., 
2003) and optimal trading ratios between point and nonpoint sources (Shortle, 1990; Letson, 
1992; Malik et al., 1993; Horan, 2001; Horan and Shortle, 2005; Hung and Shaw, 2005; 
Hennessy and Feng, 2007; Lankoski, Lichetenberg, and Ollikainen, 2008; Rabotyagov and Feng, 
2010). Additionally, instruments focusing on ambient pollution and efficient contract design 
have been investigated (Segerson, 1988; Horan et al., 1998; 2002; Cabe and Herriges, 1992), but 
did not receive much attention in the policy community. 
Despite subsidy programs and the development of nascent water quality trading programs 
targeting nonpoint-source agricultural water pollution, poor water quality pervades much of the 
United States, and a large amount of the remaining water quality problems are attributable to 
nonpoint agricultural sources.  
Recent US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) national water quality inventories 
shows that agriculture is the leading source of river and stream impairments and the third-largest 
source of lake, pond, and reservoir impairments. According to the latest National Summary of 
Assessed Waters Report (2010), the water quality of 53% of nationwide rivers and streams 
assessed in the survey has been found as improper for the designed use (Figure 1). The 
increasing trend (50% in 2008, and 44% in 2006) shows that there has been little success in 
reducing the impact of nonpoint-source pollution (US EPA, 2011). 
These statistics suggest that existing efforts that grant the implicit right to pollute to 
nonpoint sources may not be adequate to achieve stated water quality improvement goals. 
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In addition to voluntary approaches and price instruments, economists have also long 
pointed out that instruments that regulate nonpoint sources using quantity instruments could be 
used to address nonpoint-source pollution issues. This can be achieved by either focusing on 
observable inputs and technologies or estimated emissions (Griffin and Bromley, 1982; Shortle 
and Dunn, 1986), or by using cap-and-trade approaches (Shortle, 1990; Malik et al., 1993). 
Despite the analyses demonstrating the theoretical viability of the strategies that directly regulate 
inputs or agricultural practices to achieve efficient pollution reduction, there have been relatively 
few examples of implementation of such strategies. One reason for the scarcity of quantity 
controls is due to the federal policy foundation for water pollution control in the United States — 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) and its amendments (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). The Act, at 
the federal level at least, effectively assigns property rights to pollute in the nation’s waterways 
to agricultural nonpoint sources. Specifically, nonpoint sources are excluded from NPDES 
permit requirements, which is the main mechanism in the Act through which reductions in 
emissions to water are regulated and achieved.  
It is important to note however that states are free to implement their own agricultural 
pollution control reduction policies, which can involve direct regulation. While not common, 
existing programs indicate the potential for this approach. The state of Florida provided an 
interesting example with the Everglades Forever Act in 1996, when agricultural nonpoint sources 
in the South Florida Agricultural Management District were directly required to implement 
conservation practices for lowering the phosphorus levels in the Everglades area. Over the 17-
year history of the program, measureable reductions in ambient pollution from these sources 
have been more than 55% on average (SFWMD New Release, July 2012).  
Recently, Kling (2011) reviewed the policy context and argued that the state of economic 
theory, the environmental science knowledge on the fate and transport of emissions and the 
effectiveness of abatement practices, and the policy environment all allow for immediate policy 
focus on NPS pollution. Relying on established ideas on water quality trading, Kling (2011) 
argued for a new NPS trading system that capitalizes on biophysical models and new 
computation tools. In this paper, we expand on the ideas of Kling (2011) and study the efficient 
design of agricultural water pollution control when the regulator is allowed to impose regulations 
or standards (either tradable or otherwise) on agricultural nonpoint sources. We do not suggest 
that such a change is on the horizon soon for many states, and recognize the important political 
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economy issues associated with such a change; but, the Florida case and other statewide 
programs warrant serious analysis of these options, particularly given the significant water 
quality problems remaining in agricultural watersheds. The focus of this study is on nonpoint 
sources, although the inclusion of point sources is clearly an important issue to consider. The 
reasons for this include (a) the extent of nonpoint sources’ contribution to water quality 
problems, (b) the regulatory environment described above, and (c) additional regulatory and risk 
issues raised in including point sources. For example, Ribaudo et al. (2008) found that if point 
sources’ emissions were fully eliminated in two-thirds of the 700 nitrogen-impaired watersheds 
across the United States, the maximum achievable nitrogen reduction would fall below 10%. 
Further, involving point sources invokes the complex CWA regulatory requirements associated 
with point sources—which may limit the efficacy and flexibility of trading programs (Shabman 
and Stephenson, 2007)— and issues of definition and treatment of different degrees of risk 
involved in control of point vs. nonpoint emissions (Shortle and Horan (2008) provide an 
excellent treatment).  
Specifically, we are looking for a simple (for the regulated entities) and effective (in terms 
of reaching water quality goals) nonpoint-source regulation under the three sets of difficulties 
facing regulators. The difficulties regulators face are: (a) imperfect information on the abatement 
costs of individual farms, (b) difficulty (rather, impossibility) in observing pollution at the farm 
level, and (c) inherent nonlinearities in the water quality production function (i.e., the fate, 
transport, and interactions between individual farmer’s emissions that ultimately affect the water 
body of concern). We believe that these characteristics typify most, if not all, agricultural 
watersheds.  
Producers have a variety of conservation practices from which to choose, many of which 
require both direct costs and implicit costs (lost yield, additional risk, etc.) that are likely to vary 
by farm characteristics, climate, and other idiosyncratic features of farms. Thus, individual 
producers are quite likely to have better information about their true cost of adopting 
conservation practices than regulators. From the regulator’s perspective, this means that it can be 
difficult to identify the least-cost allocation of emission reductions efficiently across sources to 
achieve a given water quality improvement goal. 
The second difficulty relates to the challenges of observing and monitoring the pollution 
impacts of farming activities in agricultural watersheds. A well-known feature of nonpoint-
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source pollution is that each polluter’s emissions are stochastic and unobservable (Shortle and 
Horan, 2001). Although it is not technically impossible to strictly monitor the amounts of 
fertilizers and other chemical applications, it is likely significantly easier to focus on observable 
abatement actions such as adoption of pollution-reducing practices. This challenge was one of 
the reasons Kling (2011), following the nonpoint-source literature tradition dating back to at least 
Griffin and Bromley (1982), proposed a system based around observable actions.1  
Finally, the ultimate fate and transport of these emissions once they leave the edge of a field 
and find their way into the water bodies of concern is an area with interesting theoretical and 
practical implications. While theoretical papers often postulate that the fate and transport process 
is linear and separable between emissions from various fields, hydrologists note that this process 
is actually likely to be highly nonlinear and nonseparable. We refer to the process as a “water 
quality production function” and describe it below.2 The state of practice in environmental 
sciences is to rely on various biophysical simulation models that can (albeit imperfectly) capture 
the key nonlinearities and interactions between individual emissions as they contribute to 
watershed-level indicators of water quality.  
With these challenges in mind, we propose and evaluate a range of simple and practical 
policy approaches for regulating emissions from nonpoint agricultural sources within a 
watershed which are focused on abatement actions at the farm scale, and which utilize the full 
state-of-the-art environmental process models. The three approaches we consider allow differing 
degrees of flexibility for individual emitters. First, we examine a command-and-control (CAC) 
approach whereby the regulator requires abatement actions (conservation practices) to specific 
fields in a watershed. Second, we consider a type of “performance standard” (PS) where each 
                                                            
1 Some abatement activities are easier to monitor than others. Structural conservation practices are, for instance, 
easier to observe and monitor than input use. The monitoring and certification of input use is possible, as evidenced 
by various organic certification schemes. In this paper, we include a range of abatement activities, including input 
use modification, and leave the exploration of consequences of degrees of observability of different abatement 
activities to future work.  
2 In the literature, Shortle and Horan (2001) refer to it as the “fate and transport function.” We note that the 
biophysical models are often capable of producing outputs beyond the water quality indicators discussed in this 
paper. One argument for the approach we propose (to integrate the process model into an economic pollution control 
policy) is that in the proposed approach changing the environmental indicator (for example, considering phosphorus 
or sediment, or pesticides, as opposed to nitrogen) may often be accomplished by simply selecting the relevant 
model output. Approaches which seek to replace the model with a mathematical function that is differentiable may 
require a lot of work tailored to the particular pollutant. Further, in practice, once an economic policy controlling, 
say, nitrates, is proposed, stakeholders often wish to know the impacts on other environmental indicators, which a 
tailor-made mathematical relationship used to formulate economically efficient policy is not capable of addressing; 
but, the consistent use of the same biophysical model can easily assess the impacts of any policy outcome with 
respect to other modeled environmental variables.  
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farmer has the flexibility to choose relevant abatement actions, subject to certain farm-level 
performance requirements. Finally, we evaluate the performance of a trading program proposed 
by Kling (2011), where the producers can trade credits associated with abatement actions with 
other emitters in the watershed (conditional on meeting their farm-level performance target). For 
each of these approaches, we discuss the information and optimization requirements for 
regulators, and if they can improve the performance of a policy approach by using some cost 
information in conjunction with water quality models. We demonstrate the application of our 
approach to a real agricultural watershed of substantial size, utilizing field-scale spatial 
information. 
We evaluate the ease of implementation and efficiency of these regulatory approaches under 
four scenarios. First, we assume that the regulator has perfect cost information, perfect 
information regarding farm-level emissions, and that the water quality production function is in 
fact linear and separable. In this benchmark case, it is straightforward to see that either the CAC, 
the on-farm performance standard, or credit trading can achieve the “first-best” cost-efficient 
case (least-cost solution, with watershed-level water quality objective, specified as a mean 
ambient loading, met).3 In the second case, we relax the assumption that the regulator has perfect 
information on costs, but retain the other two assumptions. It is also straightforward to show that 
the permit trading program can achieve the least-cost solution, but in general, the CAC and 
performance standard approaches cannot. These two cases are simple examples of well-known 
efficiency properties of permit trading approaches.  
Of more interest are the third and fourth cases. In the third case, we assume that for purposes 
of ease of implementation, the trading program is implemented using a linear approximation to 
the true nonlinear, nonseparable production function, while maintaining the assumption that the 
field-level emissions reductions are known. In the fourth, this assumption is relaxed and 
observable abatement actions become the focus of the program—we assume the use of a linear 
approximation to the production function, and the use of a point system, to approximate emission 
reductions associated with abatement actions at the field scale. 
We show that allowing for the more realistic water-quality production process does not 
preclude the regulator from using any of the three approaches. We do see, however, that two 
                                                            
3 For example, the policy goal for reducing the Northern Gulf of Mexico Hypoxic zone (a direct consequence of 
nutrient enrichment from agriculture), is specified as a 5-year average (EPA-SAB, 2007). 
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findings emerge: (a) some approximations may be required, which introduces the possibility of 
non-attainment of the water quality goal (even on average), and (b) under some conditions 
(having unbiased cost information and a good (unbiased) model of the water quality process) the 
regulator can do better by engaging in optimization exercises prior to implementing the policy. 
 In comparing the cases, we consider both the ease of implementation of a least-cost solution 
by the regulator and the potential for efficiency enhancements from implementing a market-
based solution. We consider that the regulator may face a tradeoff between the cost-efficiency 
and the effectiveness of a program (where the specified water quality target may not be met, 
which can occur in both Cases 3 and 4).4 Using simulation-optimization tools, we provide an 
empirical assessment of the magnitudes of inefficiencies in terms of cost and potential 
ineffectiveness in terms of nutrient reductions. Finally, we suggest simple corrections to the 
design of market-based programs that are capable of overcoming the issue of ineffectiveness.  
We begin the paper with a simple model that captures the key attributes of the nonpoint-
source water quality problem as related to agricultural emissions from farm fields. We then 
identify the first-best solution. We describe each of the second-best designs described above and 
evaluate their efficiency properties relative to the first-best (cost-efficient allocation of 
conservation practices).  
 
Conceptual Model 
Consider a simple model of pollution where water quality in a watershed is impaired by 
runoff from agricultural fields (for example, nitrogen or phosphorus).5 There are N farms in the 
watershed. The farms are heterogeneous with respect to physical characteristics such as soil, 
slope, rainfall, etc. The ambient water quality level is monitored in-stream, at the outlet of the 
                                                            
4 We are framing the discussion in terms of meeting a target specified as some statistic of the distribution of 
pollutant loadings which results from a specific set of on-farm abatement actions. Due to the inherently stochastic 
nature of weather, precipitation, and other driving factors, abatement targets can only be achieved in probabilistic 
terms (e.g., mean, or as a quantile). For simplicity, we focus on the mean water quality indicators, but the conceptual 
discussion applies to targets formulated as other functions of the water quality distribution. In our discussion, we 
focus on expected water quality with respect to natural variability, and alternative policy approaches are evaluated 
under the same implicit environmental conditions. Further, the expectations are taken with respect to natural 
uncertainty, and not the regulator’s uncertainty over abatement costs. The latter case leads to results which lead the 
optimal trading ratios and permit market designs to depend on the parameters of cost uncertainty (Shortle and 
Horan, 2008; Rabotyagov and Feng, 2010; Yates and Rigby 2012: 
http://www.webmeets.com/AERE/2012/prog/viewpaper.asp?pid=99).  
 
5 We adopt notation similar to Shortle and Abler (1997).  
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watershed. Let ݎ௜ be the ith farm's reduction in pollution measured at the edge of the field (that is, 
farm-level pollution abatement): 
ݎ௜ ൌ 	 ݎ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߦሻ		∀	݅ ൌ 	1, . . . , ܰ,                                                              (1) 
where ݔ௜	is a ܬ ൈ 1 vector of ܬ mutually exclusive conservation practices farm i,6 	ߛ௜ represents 
the farm's physical characteristics, and ߦ	represents the random factor related to the weather 
and/or other stochastic influences. 
Abatement costs are defined as the difference between baseline profits and the profits 
associated with adopting a conservation practice on a given field.7 We assume that the costs of 
adoption vary across locations due to both difference in physical characteristics (soils, slope, 
etc.) and management abilities.  
 Farms are decision-making agents that maximize profits by choosing conservation practices 
based on the regulations, if any, they face. Farms are price takers in both output and input 
markets. The baseline edge-of-field emissions are the result of this maximization behavior absent 
any regulations regarding the pollution or conservation practices. 
The total ambient pollution is given by an expected water quality production 
function,	ܹሺݎሻ, which is a function of each farm’s individual edge-of-field emission reductions, 
where ݎ is the vector of ݎ௜.8 In addition to depending on the edge-of-field emissions, the ambient 
pollution level, in general, will also depend on the location of those fields within the watershed. 
The water quality production function reflects the complexity of the hydrological processes that 
affect the fate and transport of nutrients from the land to the water. In practice, the true form of 
this function is not likely to be known, though there is a range of watershed-based water quality 
models that approximate these hydrological and biophysical processes, such as the Soil and 
Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), and the Water Erosion Prediction Project (WEPP). This 
                                                            
6 For notational simplicity, we define the simultaneous use of two conservation practices as a separate, unique 
practice.  
7 Equivalently under risk neutrality, abatement costs can be defined as the farms’ willingness to accept to adopt a 
conservation practice. 
8 Focusing on expected water quality is efficient under social risk-neutrality, but social preferences may require 
“safety-first”-type pollution constraints (Shortle and Horan, (2008) provide a review). We do not take up such 
constraints in this work, although we sketch out how the policy could be modified to incorporate such preferences 
on the part of society. Instead, in this work, we focus on nonlinearity in the deterministic component of the water 
quality process. Nonlinearities may emerge as a result of covariances between field-level loadings and delivery 
coefficients (succinctly demonstrated in Eqs. (1) and (2) of Shortle and Horan (2008)) even in a linear specification 
of the water quality production process. Our linear (which we argue is not accurate) specification of W(r) can be 
interpreted as corresponding to Eq. (3) (ibid.).  
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function is likely to be highly nonlinear, non-differentiable, and nonseparable in the sense that 
the effects of an abatement action at one location in the watershed on the ambient water quality 
will be affected by the abatement actions (conservation practices) elsewhere in the watershed.9  
The ambient water quality at the watershed outlet can be expressed as  
  ܹሺݎሻ ൌ ܹ଴ െ ܣሺݎሻ,                                                        (2) 
where ܹ଴ is the level of water quality in the absence of regulation, and ܣሺݎሻ is the ambient 
pollution reduction associated with ݎ emission reductions—or more simply the abatement 
function. Equation (2) simply notes that the ambient water quality level associated with any 
given set of emission reductions can be expressed as the difference between the no-control 
(baseline) ambient water quality level and the in-stream abatement associated with the edge-of-
field emission reductions. 
In the following subsections, we identify the least-cost solution to a cost minimization when 
a first-best solution can be identified, and contrast it to the solution that is feasible when the 
regulator knows only the distribution of costs across the farms. Next, we add further realism to 
the problem by considering two additional complications. First, we consider the possibility that 
in addition to imperfect cost information the regulator is relying on a linear approximation to the 
water quality production function. This case could also be interpreted as a situation in which the 
authority knows the true, nonlinear watershed production function, but prefers to use a linearized 
version for watershed implementation.  
Finally, we consider the possibility that the relationship between the adoption of a 
conservation practice and the edge-of-field abatement resulting from that practice may be 
imperfectly measured, and thus the environmental authority uses approximations for the 
effectiveness of these practices in reducing edge-of-field emissions. We suggest the use of a 
points-based system as a simple approach for implementing a performance standard or trading 
program in this situation. 
 
Cases 1–3: Linear Water Quality Production Function (that is, ሺ࢘ሻ ൌ ∑ ࢊ࢏࢘࢏ሺ࢞࢏ሻࡺ࢏  ) 
                                                            
9 See for examples Braden et al. (1989), Lintner and Weersink (1999), Khanna et al. (2003), from agricultural 
economics perspective of inherent endogeneity (which we call non-separability) of ambient effectiveness of field-
level abatement actions. Briefly, both downstream and upstream abatement actions may have effects on abatement 
efforts at a field, and atmospheric deposition may affect locations not in surface or subsurface (as in the case of tile 
drainage), flowpaths.   
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Case 1: Perfect information on costs 
Suppose we seek to achieve a particular level of total ambient emissions reduction, ̅ܣ. We 
seek to minimize the abatement cost of all farms across the watershed such that the total ambient 
emissions are reduced by at least this ex ante established abatement goal. Thus, the cost 
minimization problem is 
min௫೔ೕ ∑ ܥ௜൫ݔ௜௝൯௜ 	ݏ. ݐ. Aሺrሻ 	൒ 		 ܣ,                                                             (3) 
For each farm ݅, we wish to choose a conservation practice, ݔ௜௝, such that the total ambient 
emissions in the watershed are reduced by at least ܣ. 
Under perfect information, the solution can be achieved by the environmental agency 
assigning each farm the optimal conservation practice,	ݔ௜௝∗ , thus achieving the efficient edge-of-
field discharges, ݎ௜∗, ∀	݅ ൌ 1,… ,ܰ farms and ∀	݆ ൌ 1,… , ܬ. The total abatement cost will be 
given by: 
ܶܥ∗ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜∗ሻ௜ .                                                                          (4) 
An “*” is used to indicate that this is the least-cost solution. Under perfect information, the 
environmental agency could assign the efficient conservation practice to each location. 
Alternatively, the environmental agency could require that each farm meet an individualized 
performance standard. This requirement could take the form of an edge-of-field standard to each 
farm ሺൌ ݎ௜∗ሻ or an ambient standard ሺൌ ݀௜ݎ௜∗ሻ.  
In the case of an ambient standard, an individual farm would face the following cost 
minimization problem: 10 
min௫೔ೕ ܥ௜൫ݔ௜௝൯	s. t		݀௜ݎ௜൫ݔ௜௝, ߛ௜൯ ൒ ݀௜ݎ௜∗.           (5)                                     
Clearly, under perfect information, the firm will choose the socially efficient solution, so that 
ܶܥ௣௦ ൌ ܶܥ∗, where 
ܶܥ௣௦ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௉ௌ௜ሻ௜                                                                        (6) 
is the total cost of the performance-based system , and “PS” denotes the cost minimization 
solution under performance standard program .  
                                                            
10 The farm’s solution to Eq. (5) will be invariant to whether the constraint is written as an ambient standard or 
whether it is written in terms of an edge-of-field constraint which would simply eliminate 	݀௜ from both sides of the 
equation. 
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Another alternative is to allow trading amongst farms such that a total ambient emissions 
cap is met. As Montgomery (1972) demonstrated, an “ambient based permit system” where each 
firm is faced with an ambient cap such that the total ambient emissions reduction target is met 
can achieve the least-cost allocation.  
In short, under perfect information on costs and farm-level emissions, and a linear and 
separable water quality production function, any number of regulatory approaches can be 
employed to achieve the least-cost solution. We now turn to more realistic settings.  
 
Case 2: Imperfect Information on Costs (Linear Water Quality Production Function) 
In reality, it is likely that while farms will know the true cost of their abatement actions, the 
environmental authority will not. Thus, the environmental authority will be unable to identify the 
most efficient conservation practice for each field and corresponding edge-of-field emissions. 
However the environmental agency is likely to have some limited information on the distribution 
of costs. We assume that the agency knows the vector of average costs, ߠ, but not the cost at 
each individual location. In this case, the environmental authority can solve the cost 
minimization problem:  
min௫೔ೕ ∑ ܥ௜൫ݔ௜௝, ̅ߠ൯௜ 	ݏ. ݐ. Aሺrሻ 	൒ 		 ܣ,                                                                         (7) 
where ߠ represents a vector of the mean costs of the J conservation practices, and the total cap   
is set at the ∑ ݀௜ݎపෝ	ሺ̅ߠሻሺݔ௜, ߛ௜ሻே௜ ൌ ̅ܣ. The solution to this problem will generally differ from that 
obtained in solving (3), and the assignment of abatement practices, ݔపෝ , will not necessarily 
coincide with the least-cost solution, ݔ௜∗. Likewise, the edge-of-field emissions reductions,	ݎపෝሺߠ), 
will be different from the first-best, ݎ௜∗.  
Thus, if the environmental authority were to impose the solution, ݎపෝሺߠ), this may not reflect the 
least-cost allocation of conservation practices since some firms may have much lower or higher 
costs than the mean, which if known by the authority, could be used to more cost-effectively assign 
practices to fields. Nonetheless, the overall abatement target, ̅ܣ, will be met by design. 
In this case, the authority can potentially increase social welfare relative to a command-and-
control assignment of conservation actions, ݔపෝ , by allowing firms to meet a performance 
standard, ݀௜	ݎపෝ	ሺ̅ߠሻ. Since firms know their true costs, they may be able to meet the performance 
standard allocated to them less expensively by using a different conservation practice (or 
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combination of practices). If faced with a performance standard, firms will face the following 
optimization problem, 
min௫೔ೕ ܥ௜൫ݔ௜௝, ߠ௜൯	s. t		ݎ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜ሻ ൒		ݎపෝ	ሺ̅ߠሻ                                                              (8)                                     
where they use their true vector of conservation practice costs, ߠ௜, to solve the problem. 
Additional cost savings are potentially achievable if the environmental authority makes the 
performance standard tradable. For example, the following system could be instituted. Suppose 
farmers in a watershed are brought under an “abatement credit trading system,” where every 
farmer is obligated to earn a set number of credits (points), with additional opportunities to earn  
credits from undertaking abatement at their fields or purchasing credits from other farms. If 
producers undertook conservation actions that generated more points than their minimum 
requirement, they could sell those credits. Let ݈పഥ଴ be ݅th farm’s abatement credit requirement, 
which can be satisfied in two ways—obtaining credit for on-farm conservation practices or 
purchasing (or selling) credits ݈௜ from (to) other farms. A farmer solves: 
min௫ೕ,௟೔∈௑ ܥ௜௉ሺݔ௜,	ሻ ൅ ݌݈௜    s. ݐ.			݀௜	ݎ௜൫ݔ௝, ߠ௜൯ ൅ ݈௜ ൒ 	 ݈పഥ଴                        (9) 
and the credit price is determined in a market equilibrium where ∑ ݈௜ ൌ 0௜ . This model implicitly 
assumes that the edge-of-field nutrient losses, ݎపෝ,	 are known, which defines a one-to-one relation 
between the edge-of-field discharges and the number of credits.  
Indeed, when the performance standard is fully tradable, the least-cost solution would be 
achievable, as this would be equivalent to implementing Montgomery’s ambient-based permit 
system. Since by construction the ∑ ݈ప଴ഥ௜ ൌ ̅ܣ, unfettered trading amongst firms who each know 
their own true costs will achieve the least-cost solution and the ambient environmental goal is 
satisfied. 
 
Case 3: No information on costs (Linear Water Quality Production Function) 
This case is perhaps the most vivid demonstration of the appeal of market-based systems. In 
particular, although a regulator is capable of devising a CAC system which ensures that the water 
quality goal is met (by picking any farm-level allocation of abatements ݎ௣ s.t. ܣ൫ݎ௣൯ ൌ ̅ܣ), the 
cost-efficiency of such a program is likely to be quite low (hence the term “third-best” in Table 
1, which summarizes the cases). However, a trading system is capable of achieving first-best, 
12 
 
where both the environmental goal is reached by construction and the total abatement costs are 
minimized.  
When the water quality production function is described by a linear, separable function with 
exogenous (fixed) delivery coefficients, market-based solutions clearly outperform command-
and-control strategies, regardless of any information that the regulator possesses. This is, of 
course, the theoretical basis for the appeal of permit trading systems.  
 
Cases 4–6: Nonlinear and Nonseparable Water Quality Production Function.  
Cases (1)–(3) rely on a linear, separable water quality production function. The actual 
pollution processes are not likely to be well described by such functions. Yet the longevity of the 
linear and separable model of the water quality production process can probably be attributed more 
to analytical convenience and the well-known attractive features of incentive-based systems 
(recapitulated in Cases (1)–(3)) than to the ability of this model to accurately represent reality. 
There exists a great deal of scientific evidence that the more complex pollution fate and transport 
function is required to accurately represent the impact of on-farm actions on ambient pollution 
levels. This recognition is not by itself new—researchers beginning with Braden et al. (1989), 
followed by Lintner and Weersink (1999), Khanna et al. (2003), Arabi et al. (2006), and 
Rabotyagov et al. (2010) more recently have grappled with the issue of nonlinearity (and resulting 
endogeneity of effectiveness of abatement actions) of water pollution processes. As a result, 
evaluating efficient pollution control strategies requires either building a mathematical program—
and essentially building a model of the pollution process—or using optimization approaches that 
incorporate the biophysical model in its entirety (simulation-optimization approach). In the former 
approach, the solution techniques included dynamic programming (Braden et al., 1989; mixed 
integer programming, Khanna et al., 2003), and evolutionary algorithms (Arabi et al,. 2006; 
Rabotyagov et al., 2010) were used in the simulation-optimization approach.  
In all cases, the solutions obtained do not immediately lend themselves to being replicated in 
a simple market-based system. At the crux of the market design issue in these cases is the ability 
to set the right (explicit or implicit) trading ratio and to provide an ambient pollution constraint 
that ensures the attainment of the water quality goal. In the case of the linear and separable water 
quality production function, it is straightforward: farms trade according to the ratio of the 
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delivery coefficients and the pre- and post-trading outcome has to satisfy the ambient pollution 
constraint.11  
In the case of nonlinear and nonseparable water quality production function, the ability to set 
the right trading ratio and the effective trading system constraint is not assured. To demonstrate, 
assume for the moment that A(r) is differentiable. Then the first-order Taylor series expansion 
around some initial vector of on-farm pollution reductions (e.g., baseline r0) can be written as: 
ܣሺݎሻ ≅ ∑ ఋ஺ሺ௥ሻఋ௥೔ ሺݎ௜ െ ݎ௜
଴ሻே௜ୀଵ                                                                                                                                   (10) 
In this case, ఋ஺ሺ௥ሻఋ௥೔ ൌ ݀௜
ᇱ
 can potentially serve as the delivery coefficients and provide the 
basis for forming the trading ratios, but two things need to be observed. First, the “delivery 
coefficient” is a function of the abatement activities of other farms, and if a trading system is to 
be set up, some initial vector of abatement actions needs to be used. Second, the approximation 
above may be quite close to the initial abatement action vector (that is, around the baseline), but 
may be quite poor at the post-trading vector of on-farm abatements. This may lead to non-
attainment (even on average) of the water quality goal.  
 Similarly to Cases (1)–(3), for Cases (4)–(6), a market-based system could take the 
following form. Let ݈పഥ଴be ݅th farm’s abatement requirement and ݈௜ the quantity of credits 
bought/sold by the farmer: 
min௫ೕ,௟೔∈௑ ܥ௜௉ሺݔ௜,	ሻ ൅ ݌݈௜    s. ݐ.				݀௜ᇱݎ௜൫ݔ௝, ߠ௜൯ ൅ ݈௜ ൒ 	 ݈పഥ଴ and the market clearing condition 
∑ ݈௜ ൌ 0௜ .  
The main difference from Cases (1)–(3) is that, instead of ݀௜ (assumed to be a true delivery 
coefficient in Cases (1)–(3)), ݀௜ᇱ	is used, where the prime indicates that this is a set of derived 
delivery coefficients that were obtained from some form of linearization of the nonlinear water 
quality production function.  
A separate, and important, issue is the selection of ݈పഥ଴—that is, the vector of on-farm 
ambient reduction requirements. Under a linear water quality production function, delivery 
coefficients are known, so any combination of ݈పഥ଴
ᇱݏ satisfying ∑ ݈ప଴ഥ௜ ൌ ∑ ݀௜݈ప௙଴തതത௜ ൌ ̅ܣ, (where ݈௜௙଴  
                                                            
11 Under cost uncertainty, optimal trading ratios have been shown to be a function of regulator’s information on 
abatement costs (Rabotyagov and Feng, 2010; Yates and Rigby, 2012).  
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represents the on-farm pollution reduction requirement), is acceptable. This is identical to the 
issue of defining the cap by choosing the right number of permits to distribute in a cap-and-trade 
program design.  
Under a nonlinear water quality production function, the “permit distribution” issue 
represents additional difficulty. Unlike the linear case, where an increase in abatement at one 
farm, when appropriately weighted by the ratio of the delivery coefficients, is equivalent to the 
decrease in abatement at another farm, “permit allocation” matters for the achievement of 
ambient water quality in the non-linear case. Below, we demonstrate how this issue can be 
addressed involving assignment of weights (“point values”) for abatement actions, which provide 
implicit trading ratios, and what the consequences are for water quality standard non-attainment. 
Cases (4)–(6) highlight that, unlike in the case of a linear and separable water quality 
production function, more flexible systems may outperform CAC in terms of abatement costs, 
but they may also lead to non-attainment of a water quality goal. The magnitude of the 
inefficiency or the extent of non-attainment is an empirical question. 
 
Designing a nonpoint-source pollution policy based on conservation actions and an 
approximation to the water quality production function 
We seek to evaluate simple, abatement action-based regulatory systems, where we recognize 
that the true ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ function cannot be measured perfectly, and easily observable abatement 
actions are used as a proxy, with weights created to achieve a reasonable, scientifically 
justifiable, approximation to ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ. Specifically, under a point-based trading system agricultural 
producers would be required to undertake abatement actions that accrue a sufficient number of 
points per acre for their farms (Kling, 2011).  
Under the point accumulation system, each program-specified abatement action is assigned 
a specific point value. The point values reflect (approximately) both the edge-of-field 
effectiveness of abatement actions and the impact of edge-of-field reductions on the ambient 
water quality. Specifically, the regulator utilizes a linear approximation of the effect of 
abatement actions on both the edge-of-field and ambient water quality:  ܣሺܺሻ ≅ ∑ ݀௜ᇱ		ݎ௜൫ݔ௝൯ே௜ ൌ
∑ ∑ ݀௜ᇱݓ௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵே௜ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵே௜  , where edge-of-field reductions are given by ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ≡
∑ ݓ௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵ  , and the total number of points earned by the farmer is given by  ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵ  where 
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ܽ௜௝ provides the weight (in terms of abatement “points”) given to a conservation practice j at 
farm i. We refer to ܽ௜௝  as a “points coefficient”. The points coefficient has an obvious 
interpretation of giving a marginal benefit, in terms of water quality abatement, of practice ݆ at 
location ݅ (expressed as mean annual reductions in kg N). Below, we discuss the approach for 
estimating the vector of ܽ௜௝’s for the study watershed.  
The command-and-control policy does not require the use of points, as each farmer is 
assumed to be directly required to undertake abatement actions. For the more flexible approach 
(on-farm performance standard), the regulator needs to choose the appropriate on-farm (edge-of-
field) pollution reduction, where the reduction is specified in terms of “points” that accrue to a 
farmer for each unit of pollution abatement action.  
Under this approach, a farmer is free to solve the on-farm cost-minimization problem: 
min௫೔ೕ,௕೔∈௑ ܥ௜௉ሺݔ௜௝	ሻ   s. ݐ.		 ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵ ൒ 	ܾ௜௢, where the performance requirement is specified by 
ܾ௜௢. 
Under the trading approach, credits generated by abatement actions are freely tradeable, on a 
one-to-one basis, across the watershed. As a result, a farmer solves: 
min௫೔ೕ,௕೔∈௑ ܥ௜௉ሺݔ௜௝	ሻ ൅ ݌ܾ௜    s. ݐ.		 ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵ ൅ ܾ௜ ൒ 	ܾ௜௢                         (11) 
where ܾ௜௢ is the “points requirement” that a farmer can satisfy by undertaking abatement actions 
on-farm or by buying points in the market, with the point price determined in a points market 
equilibrium where ∑ ܾ௜ ൌ 0௜ .  
Conceptually, our proposed trading approach is a combination of an emission permit system 
(EPS), where rights are defined in terms of what firms can emit, and an ambient permit system 
(APS), where rights are defined in terms of pollution contributions to a receptor point 
(Montgomery, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1988). Like in an EPS system, firm permit (points) 
requirements are specified at the firm level and not at the level of the pollution receptor, and 
trades in points can occur on a one-to-one basis across the entire watershed. Similar to an APS 
system, the point values estimate aims to approximate the impact of abatement actions at the 
(single) pollution receptor (watershed outlet). Trading ratios among abatement actions and across 
the watershed are specified implicitly by the promulgated point values.  
In this work, we consider a relatively simple case where there is a single receptor (watershed 
outlet). The obvious attraction of considering a market with a single receptor point is its 
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simplicity and a decreased potential for “thin” markets. Permit trading systems with multiple 
receptor requirements are likely to suffer from the problems of imperfect competition, thin 
markets, and high transactions costs (Ermoliev et al., 2000). Thus, similar proposals for permit 
trading involving multiple receptors have introduced the need for some kind of a “smart market” 
where the burden of optimization and satisfaction of environmental constraints is delegated to 
the regulator, who solves for appropriate vector of equilibrium prices in all specified markets.12 
Morgan et al. (2000) and Prabodanie et al. (2010) are the most closely related proposals, both 
proposing a use of a water quality simulation model and a market broker. Our approach can be 
extended to multiple pollution receptors and can easily accommodate a “smart market.” We 
show, however, that even in the presence of (a) multiple abatement actions and (b) potentially 
complicated fate and transport relationships, a simple “thick” market involving all farms in a 
watershed, and a single freely tradable commodity (point credit) has very attractive properties in 
terms of reaching environmental goals at the watershed outlet.  
Finally, we consider trading between nonpoint sources (which have been transformed into 
knowable “point sources” by means of a water quality simulation model (an insight apparently 
due to Morgan et al. (2000)). When expected water quality goals are sought by the regulator, the 
point system we propose can be extended in an unmodified fashion to include point sources 
(which SWAT has the ability to simulate). A substantial literature exists discussing choosing the 
correct trading ratio between point and nonpoint sources when the regulator treats point source 
and nonpoint source abatement as different in risk (e.g., Horan et al., 2002; Hung and Shaw, 
2005). Conceptually, the point values assigned to nonpoint sources could be adjusted in a similar 
fashion.  
 
Empirical Application 
Study area: Boone Watershed River 
The study area is represented by a watershed located in the north-central part of Iowa, the 
Boone Watershed River (BWR). The watershed covers more than 237,000 acres in six counties. 
                                                            
12 Proposed “smart” markets appear to promise to implement the original idea of Krupnick et al. (1983) of a 
pollution offset (PO) system where trades are allowed subject to attainment of relevant environmental quality 
constraints.  
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The watershed area is crop intensive, with corn and soybean representing almost 90% of the 
agricultural activity. The surface area had been intensively tile drained, and as a result, the 
wetlands area had been reduced significantly. Moreover, the Boone watershed agricultural area 
has been found responsible for some of the highest nitrogen loadings among Iowa’s watersheds 
(Libra et al., 2004). 
Land use in the watershed is dominated by agriculture, with 89.7% of the area representing 
cropland, 5.6% of the area representing retired land, 2.6% forestry area, and the rest of the area 
accounting for urban areas and water surfaces. Most of the land is flat area, characterized by soils 
with low slopes, (i.e., 73% of the areas have the length of the slope less than 0.01 inches). Slope 
characteristics are relevant to our analysis in two ways. First, the size of the slope affects the 
choice of the conservation practices. Second, it affects the total discharges associated with a 
particular area. Corn suitability rating (CSR) is another characteristic that defines the potential 
yield.13 CSR is an index that ranges between 0 and 100, where high values are associated with 
high quality soils. A soil with a high CSR value is less likely to have high rates of fertilization, 
and at the same time is less likely to be considered for land retirement as a solution for reducing 
the nitrate loadings. In the BWR more than 50% of the soils have been rated with CSR values 
ranging 50 to 79, and 40% of the soils have CSR values higher than 80. 
The required data for a modeling system (i.e., SWAT model) was collected at Common 
Land Unit (CLU) level.14 More than 16,300 CLUs have been identified in the BWR. As a 
Hydrological Response Unit (HRU) is the unit required by the SWAT model, the CLUs were 
regrouped into 2,968 HRUs. Data about crop rotation, land use, fertilizer management, tillage 
and conservation practices were provided by a field level survey conducted by Kiepe (2005). 
Conservation practices 
The set of conservation practices selected as abatement practices for achieving the nutrient 
loading standards includes reducing the rate of fertilizer application, conservation tillage (i.e., no 
till), cover crops, and land retirement (Table 2). The above set is augmented with all feasible 
combinations of these practices but land retirement (i.e., the combination of no till and cover 
                                                            
13 CSR is a procedure that rates different kind of soils for its potential row crop productivity. It was developed for 
Iowa soils. Detailed information can be found at: (http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Publications/PM1168.pdf) 
14 “A Common Land Unit (CLU) is the smallest unit of land that has a permanent, contiguous boundary, a common 
land cover and land management, a common owner and a common producer in agricultural land associated with 
USDA farm programs. CLU boundaries are delineated from relatively permanent features such as fence lines, roads, 
and/or waterways.”( http://www.fsa.usda.gov) 
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crops is considered as an independent conservation practice). The baseline is also considered as a 
choice alternative. This allows considering the cases where keeping the baseline is optimal. 
 
Conservation practices cost 
Costs for each conservation practice were drawn from several sources. All costs are 
expressed as dollars per acre. The cost for adoption of no-till was drawn from Kling et al. (2005). 
The cost of adopting no till is $9.62 per acre if the baseline has assigned conventional tillage, and 
$4.81 if the baseline is assigned mulch tillage.15Cover crop cost estimates were provided by local 
farmers.16 The average cost for cover crops is $25.17 
An implied yield curve for corn-soybean rotation, where yield is estimated as a function of 
fertilizer applied, was used to derive the cost for reducing the fertilizer application rate. The 
procedure is similar to the one used by Rabotyagov (2007), Sawyer et al. (2006), Libra, Wolter, 
and Langel (2004), and Feng, Jha, and Gassman (2008). Data from Iowa field experiments, 
available through ISU Extension was used to estimate an implicit nitrogen-based yield curve. 
The cost of nitrogen fertilizer reduction varies across fields based on the fertilizer application 
rate reported for the baseline scenario. The implied yield curve is a four-degree polynomial 
function of the fertilizer rate.18 The cost of reducing fertilization is given by multiplying a 20% 
percent reduction in the baseline fertilizer rate by the price of corn and by subtracting the cost 
savings from applying less fertilizer. The price of corn used is $3.08 per bushel.19  
The cash rental rates available online (Edward and Smith, 2009) in conjunction with the 
corn suitability ratings (CSR) available were used to compute the cost of retiring land out of 
production. The cost of land retirement for each field is obtained by multiplying the cash rental 
rate per unit of CSR by area and corresponding CSR. The cash rental rates are used as proxies 
for the opportunity cost of land retirement (Secchi and Babcock, 2007). A zero cost is considered 
for no change from the baseline practices. The cost of the conservation practices obtained as a 
                                                            
15 Mulch tillage is an interim type of tillage (between 30% and 60% of residue remaining). 
16 The cover crops cost estimate was provided by Tom Kaspar scientist at USDA-ARS National Laboratory for 
Agriculture and the Environment. 
17 Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa – 2008 (FM-1712) and Estimating Farm Machinery Costs (PM-710), 
actual seed costs, and bulk generic glyphosate in 2008. No fertilizer is applied for cover crop growth 
18 The coefficients of nitrogen response yield curve Y=-3.32904824784026E-09*N^4+8.88402E-06*N^3-
0.004459448*N^2+0.822128904200617*N-0.374570292118776 
19 Price per bushel and represents the average corn price for Iowa for 2004–2009. Source of corn price is: 
http://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/crops/pdf/a2-11.pdf 
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combination of the primary ones (i.e. no till and reduced fertilizer) are obtained by summing per 
acre cost of each conservation practice considered in the combination.  
 
Water quality production function: Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) 
The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), is a complex water quality watershed-based 
hydrological model developed by the US Department of Agriculture to simulate the impact of 
point and nonpoint source emissions (Arnold et al. 1998; Arnold and Fohrer, 2005; and Gasmann 
et al., 2008). The model is used to estimate the changes in nutrient loadings as a response to 
alternative conservation practices under different crop choices and rotation alternatives. In order 
to run simulations, the watershed, a well-defined geographical entity, is divided into several sub 
watersheds or subbasins. In SWAT, each sub watershed is delineated further into smaller 
HRUs.20 
 
The optimization method 
The development of hydrological models like SWAT, calibrated with watershed-specific 
data, makes it possible to simulate the impact of different watershed scenarios on water quality. 
A watershed is divided into hundreds of fields, and each field may have multiple agricultural 
practices that are suitable for its type of soils. For example, for a set of 9 agricultural practices 
and 2968 fields, there are a total of 9ଶଽ଺଼ possible watershed scenarios. Using SWAT, a water 
quality level can be estimated for each watershed configuration. With appropriate economic data, 
the cost associated with a particular scenario can be assessed. The question arises: which of those 
scenarios is most desirable from a cost and/or pollution reduction perspective?  
The implementation of an evolutionary algorithm provides one way to deal with the 
combinatorial nature of the watershed simulation-optimization model. Evolutionary or genetic 
algorithms (EA) are designed to mimic biological evolution (Deb, 2001). Genetic algorithms are 
heuristic global search algorithms that are able to find the nearly optimal solution by using 
principles like "natural selection" and "survival of the fittest." The main terminology used in 
                                                            
20 An HRU, is a conceptual entity, with no precise spatial location within the sub-watershed. It is identified as a 
percentage area in the sub-watershed with homogenous soil, land use and management practices. The primary water 
and loading simulations are made at the HRU level. The estimated loadings can be interpreted as edge-of-field run 
off emissions. 
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defining EAs is similar to that used in evolutionary biology, and consists of terms such as 
population, genome, individual, allele set, offspring, recombination, mutation, etc.  
In our case, an individual represents a watershed configuration. The genome is defined by 
the total number of fields. The fields’ properties, or genes, are defined in terms of the agricultural 
abatement practices available in the watershed. The set of all agricultural or conservation 
practices defines the allele set. Hence, an individual is defined by a particular combination of 
fields and the abatement practices. An individual represents a possible solution to the optimal 
placement of abatement practices, where as a population represents the set of all potential 
solutions to the same problem. The goal of the evolution process is to find the watershed 
configuration that achieves a given level of ambient standard at the lowest cost, or given a 
budget achieves the lowest ambient pollution level. 
We use a simulation optimization system using SWAT and modification of the Strength 
Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm 2 (Zitzler, Laumanns, and Thiele, 2001, as described in 
Rabotyagov et al., 2010) to approximate the solution to a two objective minimization problem 
that simultaneously minimizes the total mean annual nitrogen loadings and the costs of 
abatement practices for the study watershed. The solution to this multiple objective problem can 
be interpreted as a set of Pareto-nondominated points in the search space, where each point on 
the frontier, called individual, is a specific watershed configuration that achieves a particular 
level of nitrogen loadings in the least-cost way. 
 
Obtaining the point coefficients 
We estimate the point coefficients by linearizing both the water quality production function 
and the edge-of-field pollution reduction in terms of abatement actions.  
Specifically, as in Eq. (10), we approximate the nonlinear water quality production function 
by ܣሺܺሻ ≅ ∑ ݀௜ᇱ		ݎ௜൫ݔ௝൯ே௜ ൌ ∑ ∑ ݀௜ᇱݓ௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵே௜ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝ ൌ ܺܽ௃௝ୀଵே௜ , where ܺ is the vector of 
specific abatement actions, and ܽ is the vector of point coefficients. For the empirical 
demonstrations, we assume that point coefficients are obtained at the level of a subbasin 
(although obtaining point coefficients that assign different point values for conservation practices 
for every farm would follow the same steps). There are 30 subbasins in the watershed, (ܰ ൌ 30), 
and 9 abatement actions are considered (ܬ ൌ 9). Thus, we need to estimate the 270 ൈ 1 vector of 
ܽ. In order to do that, we generate 3,000 random allocations of abatement actions to the fields in 
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the watershed, and simulate the water quality impacts using SWAT. The resulting 3,000 
simulated abatement outcomes of water quality, denoted by ܣ௦, are combined with the 3,000 
ൈ 270 vector of abatement action assignments, denoted by ܺ௦, to estimate the points coefficient 
vector ܽ by ordinary least squares: min௔ሺܣ െ ܺܽሻᇱሺܣ െ ܺܽሻ. Table 3 presents the estimation 
results.21  
Most of the abatement actions (combinations of conservation practices) are highly 
significant across the subbasins of the watershed. The only somewhat unexpected result is that 
nitrogen fertilizer reductions alone are not always significant, but they are significant in all 
subbasins when combined with no-till (and no-till with cover crops), and in all but one (Subbasin 
27) when combined with cover crops. For subbasins with non-significant fertilizer reductions, 
fertilizer reductions are rewarded when combined with other conservation practices. Note that 
the farmers would not face an additive reward for adopting several conservation practices. In 22 
out of 30 subbasins, a farmer gets less than an additive credit for adopting no-till and cover crops 
jointly, while in the remaining subbasins, a farmer gets an additional points reward for joint 
adoption. Among nine subbasins where fertilizer reductions receive credit on their own, only one 
subbasin gets the joint adoption reward for adopting fertilizer reductions with no-till. The overall 
pattern is of non-additive rewards for adopting multiple conservation practices. Unless the 
farmers face substantial cost reductions for adopting multiple conservation practices on the same 
field, this reward system is likely to lead to single-practice adoption in subbasins with sub-
additive point credits (with fertilizer reductions adopted jointly in 21 subbasins). In terms of 
practical implementation, farmers in different subbasins are given one row of the table above, 
which specifies the credits earned from practice adoption. 
Once the regulatory agency has the estimates of point values that are credited to a particular 
abatement action in a specific subbasin, one can compute the total points value associated with 
any watershed configuration. For both the performance standard and the tradable credit 
programs, the total points value chosen by the regulator will have a direct implication for the 
watershed abatement levels achieved.  
                                                            
21 Feng, Jha, and Gassman (2008) use SWAT to estimate delivery ratios by changing N application rates in each 
subbasin of a watershed, holding rates constant in other subbasins, obtaining the implied “delivery ratio”, and 
solving for the least-cost allocation of N abatement across subbasins. As discussed above, such approach imposes 
the linear structure on the water quality production function, and estimated delivery ratios provide a coarse 
approximation to the modeling capability of SWAT.  
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We are now in the position to demonstrate the performance of all three regulatory 
approaches under different assumptions of how the regulator formulates the policy. The 
benchmark for comparison will be given by the (approximate) Pareto-efficient frontier in N-Cost 
space, obtained using simulation-optimization approaches described above (Figure 2). 
 
Evaluating CAC, the performance standard, and the trading system for different  
abatement targets 
Setting goals under the three approaches 
Under a nonlinear water quality production function, setting the on-farm or watershed-level 
goals under the CAC, PS, or a fully tradable approach is somewhat challenging. In setting up the 
CAC program, the regulator wishes to directly dictate the on-farm abatement actions and looks 
for the desired vector of abatement actions. Since this is the least flexible approach for the 
farmers, the regulator is in a position to immediately evaluate the water quality impacts of a 
CAC program using the model representation of the water quality production function—that is, 
given ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠, watershed-level abatement is ܣሺܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠ሻ. The regulator’s task is to choose 
ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠ so that ܣ൫ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠൯ ൌ ̅ܣ. If the achievement of the water quality goal is the only 
objective, the regulator can simply evaluate a range of ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠ scenarios and select one that 
achieves its goal. We will refer to such an approach (which does not utilize or require any cost 
information) as the “satisficing” approach (after Simon (1956)), and denote the prescribed vector 
abatement actions as ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௦௔௧௜௦௙௜௖௘ሺ̅ܣሻ.22 Clearly, the satisficing approach is unlikely to be cost-
efficient.  
An alternative approach for the regulator is to use some information on the costs of 
abatement actions and to optimize using cost information in the objective function. In fact, we 
assume that the regulator can do that using the methods described above. This leads to selecting 
ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௢௣௧௜௠௜௭௘ሺ̅ܣሻ as the target vector of abatement actions. In our example, this means selecting a 
Pareto-efficient solution from the frontier which achieves ̅ܣ.  
Unlike the CAC approach, where ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௦௔௧௜௦௙௜௖௘ሺ̅ܣሻ and ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௢௣௧௜௠௜௭௘ሺ̅ܣሻ can be implemented 
directly, the on-farm PS and credit trading programs require mapping the abatement actions to 
                                                            
22 Simon, H. A. (1956). "Rational choice and the structure of the environment". Psychological Review, Vol. 63 No. 
2, 129-138. (page 129: "Evidently, organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do not, in general, ‘optimize’."; 
page 136: "A ‘satisficing’ path, a path that will permit satisfaction at some specified level of all its needs. 
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on-farm or total watershed point requirements. For the PS, this involves using point coefficient 
estimates and computing ܾ௜௢ ൌ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௃௝ୀଵ , where a corresponding element of 
ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௦௔௧௜௦௙௜௖௘ሺ̅ܣሻ (ܺ௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௢௣௧௜௠௜௭௘ሺ̅ܣሻ) is used in place of ݔ௜௝௣௥௢௚௥௔௠ under the satisficing (optimizing) 
approaches.  
The same kind of assignment occurs in setting up the trading program, and the resulting on-
farm point requirements are summed to obtain the total points for the watershed as follows: 
ܲ ൌ ∑ ܾ௜௢௜ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௝௜ . Total point values associated with the satisficing (optimizing) 
approaches are denoted as  ܲ௦௔௧௜௦௙௜௖௜௡௚ and ܲ௢௣௧௜௠௜௭௘, respectively. The total points are 
translated into individual points requirements ܾ௜௢,௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚ , so that ܲ ൌ ∑ ܾ௜௢,௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚௜  where the 
initial (pre-trading) point requirements may be different from the requirements imposed under 
the on-farm performance standard.  
 
Efficiency properties of alternative programs and goal-setting approaches 
We now provide an empirical assessment of the proposed policy approaches. First, we 
compare the simulated program outcomes with the efficient frontier and assess whether the 
proposed policy approaches result in water quality non-attainment for a range of water quality 
targets. For these assessments, we keep all the costs of abatement actions constant across 
scenarios (in order to be able to make comparisons to the approximate efficient frontier).  
 We present the results for three levels of desired water quality improvements: 20%, 30%, 
and 40% desired reductions in mean annual loadings of nitrogen relative to the baseline (Table 
4). Several observations should be made. Under the CAC approaches, abatement actions are 
mandated, so non-attainment of the average water quality goal is precluded. However, under the 
PS and the trading approaches, only point totals (for the farm and the watershed, respectively) 
are mandated, and the optimization with respect to abatement actions occurs in a decentralized 
fashion; therefore, the watershed-level water quality may differ from the abatement goal. We 
find that the PS-satisficing approach leads to slight over-achievement of abatement goals for the 
range specified, and the PS-optimizing approach yields similar results (with the exception of 
slight goal non-attainment for the 40% reduction goal).  
A clear pattern of non-attainment is found under the trading approaches: whether total 
watershed point targets are specified using the satisficing or the optimizing approaches, average 
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abatement fell below the target level for the three goal values considered. However, the 
magnitude of non-attainment is fairly small (never exceeding 3.5 percentage points of 
abatement). This suggests that, at the watershed level, the total points requirement is somewhat 
biased downward and a correction may be required. We discuss the potential correction below.  
We now turn to the efficiency properties of the approaches. While the actual level of 
abatement is important in terms of evaluating the approaches, we should consider whether they 
have good cost-efficiency properties, regardless of the actual level of abatement achieved. 
Conceptually, we would like to see whether the simulated outcomes lie on the theoretical total 
abatement cost curve (or, equivalently, the efficient frontier specifying cost-pollution tradeoff). 
We do not have the theoretical frontier available, but we do have a good approximation obtained 
using simulation-optimization methods previously discussed. We compare the program outcomes 
to the empirical approximation of the efficient tradeoff frontier (Figure 2).  
For this evaluation, we use the same vector of abatement action costs to derive the tradeoff 
frontier (total abatement cost curve) and to simulate the program outcomes. In reality, such 
comparisons are going to be challenging, as the regulator is not going to have perfect information 
on abatement action costs.  
For the programs that use the satisficing approach, and do not engage in any kind of 
optimization with respect to abatement action costs prior to implementing a program, we expect 
that the least-flexible CAC approach will have the least favorable efficiency properties. We also 
expect the more flexible approaches will get progressively closer to the efficient frontier as the 
degree of cost-minimizing flexibility afforded to program participants increases. This is exactly 
the pattern we observe. The outcomes of the CAC-satisficing approach are extremely inefficient, 
being dominated by as few as 164 outcomes (for the 20% abatement goal), to as many as 435 
outcomes (30% goal) on the (approximate) efficient frontier. The PS-satisficing approach, while 
still very inefficient, allows for some flexibility on the part of the farmers, and, as a result, the 
outcomes are more efficient than the CAC outcomes, as evidenced by fewer Pareto-dominating 
outcomes across the range of abatement goals.  
We expect the trading outcome to be very nearly efficient, as a well-functioning trading 
program is intended to lead to the lowest-cost outcome, given the trading program rules. The 
trading rules in the proposed trading program are quite simple, with all the potentially 
complicated relationships between abatement actions and the watershed-level impacts 
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approximated by the regulator by a system of points at the design stage. Given that the point 
coefficients represent an approximation to the “true” nonlinear pollution process (assuming for 
the moment that a computer simulation program like SWAT is accurate), we cannot be assured 
that the outcomes will lie on the efficient frontier. However, we expect the approximation error 
to be small, and that the simulated trading outcome will be on (or very close to) the empirical 
efficient frontier.  
This is consistent with our findings in the empirical evaluation. The trading outcome, based 
on a satisficing approach (where a SWAT-evaluated abatement-action allocation satisfying an 
abatement goal is converted to point values using Eq. (10) and each farm gets an equal initial 
per-acre point allocation) is found to deviate from the efficient frontier only under the 40% 
abatement goal.23 Although the points approximation leads to some degree of goal non-
attainment, the trading program, even when constructed around an extremely inefficient 
satisficing allocation of abatement actions, performs extremely well in terms of efficiency—the 
dominating allocation outperforms the trading outcome by only 1,826 kg (0.11% of total 
abatement) in terms of N abatement, and $44,041 (0.67%) in terms of costs. 
In Table 4, the direct comparison of optimizing approaches (i.e., the approaches where the 
regulator engages in a cost-minimization exercise prior to implementing the program) is of 
limited practical interest. Clearly, as discussed above, if the regulator knows the true costs of 
abatement, any regulatory approach can be efficient (conceptually, any farm-level optimization 
is redundant). Any deviation from that result is likely due to approximation or optimization 
errors.24 We do see, as in the satisficing approach, the trading outcome again suffers from a non-
attainment issue; and, that structuring a trading program around an approximately efficient 
solution does not address target non-attainment and alternative remedies (discussed later) should 
be employed.  
The more interesting question surrounding optimizing approaches lies in their performance 
when cost information is imperfect. We expect that the attraction of cost-efficiency of a well-
                                                            
23 The equilibrium prices, corresponding to the marginal cost of N reductions implied by the abatement goal, were 
found to be the following for the satisficing (optimizing) approaches: $2.17 ($2.17) for 20% goal, $4.64 ($5.65) for 
30% goal, and $11.92 ($11.92) for 40% goal. 
24 Indeed, we see that the CAC-optimizing approach is Pareto-dominated by PS-optimizing approach. This means 
that the approximation obtained by optimization heuristics (evolutionary algorithm) is being improved on by linear 
programming. This kind of result has been noted in operations research literature (Whittaker et al. 2007 EJOR). 
Although interesting, our main focus is on the performance of optimization-improved approaches when cost 
information is not perfect and such improvements are to be expected.  
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structured trading approach (especially when modified to correct the issue of non-attainment) is 
likely to remain. However, the alternative approaches (especially if improved by optimization) 
may be found attractive where trading is politically infeasible, or secondary water quality goals 
(such as subbasin-level loadings) are deemed important.25 Finally, the degree of program 
flexibility has an impact in the abatement space, with the trading program, as the most flexible, 
likely leading to the largest range of possible water quality outcomes depending on actual cost 
realizations, the CAC outcomes allowing variation only in cost space, and PS outcomes 
occupying the intermediate ground. We provide an empirical demonstration below. 
 
Cost heterogeneity results 
 
The results above present a clear picture of potential gains in efficiency from using 
optimization approaches or from using flexible market mechanisms. We now wish to explore 
how the programs behave in the presence of significant cost heterogeneity, where the regulator 
may have some information about the costs of conservation practices (unbiased estimate of the 
mean), but the costs vary widely across the farms in the watershed. To simulate this case, we 
generate 1,000 sets of costs by randomly drawing from U [-0.8 0.8] and multiplying the mean 
estimate of costs by (1+u). When generating the cost heterogeneity across watersheds, we 
assume that for a given farm the cost of each conservation practice receives the same shock, ݑ.  
Further, we show that the non-attainment of the water quality goal that appears under trading 
programs can be mitigated by appropriately inflating the watershed points target. In our 
application, inflating the watershed points target by 7.5% shifts the distributions of simulated 
trading outcomes where the mean is approximately equal the N reduction goal.  
Next, we briefly describe the results and present the results graphically. Table 5, and Figures 
3–5 present the simulation results for the three chosen abatement goals. 
As mentioned above, the CAC (both the optimizing and the satisficing approaches) do not 
allow any variation in abatement that would result from variation in costs. Clearly, the satisficing 
CAC approach is going to be inefficient regardless of the cost draw. This inefficiency is large—
for all abatement goals, the lowest simulated cost for the CAC-satisficing approach is higher than 
                                                            
25 Often, the concern with water quality trading (or other cap-and-trade initiatives) is that trading will lead to 
emergence of “hot spots” (i.e., areas where environmental quality worsens). We evaluate the proposed trading 
approach on the field (HRU) level and do not find evidence of “hot spots” (Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix). 
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the highest simulated cost for the CAC-optimizing approach. Moreover, because the satisficing 
approach involves selecting inefficiently expensive abatement actions, shocks to the costs of 
abatement actions result in much greater variability in program costs for the CAC-satisficing 
approaches. As evidence consider the standard deviations of simulated program costs, which for 
the CAC-satisficing approach exceed the CAC-optimizing approach by at least a factor of five 
across the abatement goals. The only attractive feature of a CAC-satisficing approach (the 
approach that often echoes in policy questions like “what would it take to achieve the water 
quality goal?”) is low variability in abatement. However, in the case that CAC approach is being 
considered, the results suggest that the regulator can do much better by investing in obtaining 
estimates of abatement action costs, and using those estimates to try to direct abatement actions 
in a more cost-effective fashion. 
In terms of PS approaches, as expected, the limited flexibility provided to farmers results in 
limited variation in abatement as a result of different cost draws, but this variation is larger under 
the satisficing approach than under the optimizing approach (although the mean of abatement is 
somewhat larger under the satisficing approach). In terms of costs, once again the optimizing 
approach outperforms the satisficing approach dramatically. Should a regulator possess good 
information on the costs of abatement actions, on-farm performance standard appears to be an 
attractive approach. 
Under the trading approaches, the requirement to possess good cost information, and to use 
that information in cost-minimization prior to implementing the program in order to obtain 
desirable cost-efficiency properties, is no longer needed. Trading programs, whether structured 
using a simple “what does it take” (satisficing) approach or a more complex optimization 
approach involving using cost estimates, perform equally well in terms of cost efficiency and in 
terms of simulated variability in program costs and abatement outcomes.26 Once the nonlinear 
water-quality production process has been linearized using our approach, the private 
optimization involved in a well-functioning points market makes any optimization on the part of 
the regulator redundant. 
The only two potential drawbacks to the trading approach are the issue of non-attainment of 
the abatement goal and the higher cost-induced variability in abatement as compared to the CAC 
                                                            
26 Note that the outcomes are not identical because the abatement action allocations used to construct the trading 
programs under the two approaches involve somewhat different total point values (presented in Table 4). Under the 
same total point values, the simulated outcomes would be identical.  
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and the PS approaches. The cost-induced variability in abatement outcomes is clearly higher 
under trading approaches, as can be seen from the charts and by comparing standard deviations 
of abatement in Table 5. However, under all the abatement goals, the standard deviation of 
abatement outcomes does not exceed 0.3 percentage points. 
In terms of non-attainment, the results indicate that the mean simulated trading outcomes 
underachieve the specified abatement goals by 2.5–3.4 percentage points. In our simulations, we 
find that if we inflate the total points value by 7.5%, we are able to shift the distribution of 
trading outcomes so that the mean outcome is quite close to the desired targets. A higher 
coefficient of inflation would shift the distribution further to the right in abatement space. 
Clearly, without some knowledge of abatement costs (so that trading outcomes can be 
simulated), such inflation coefficients cannot be obtained by the regulator (and if unbiased 
estimates of costs are available, PS with optimization would be preferred!), and these correction 
factors are likely to be watershed-specific. However, if the regulator has some cost information, 
trading outcomes and consequent non-attainment can be simulated. Theoretically, trading 
outcomes are a function of private costs, and water quality outcomes will differ for each possible 
vector of abatement action costs (i.e., the total point inflation coefficient is not invariant to 
abatement costs in theory). The range of variation in water quality outcomes is an empirical 
question, and the inflation coefficient may not vary much with abatement costs in practice.  
We ask, “Can a regulator (who has some, but potentially not very accurate) cost information 
get close in terms of selecting the right point inflation coefficient for this watershed?” In other 
words, we investigate how sensitive the empirically derived 1.075 coefficient is to a range of 
trading outcomes. To do so, we model a regulator who has biased information regarding 
abatement action costs (underestimates on-farm abatement costs by as little as 10% and as much 
as 110%). Simulating trading outcomes using biased cost information, we find that the 
unmodified total point value yields, on average, 36.86% nitrogen abatement for the 40% 
abatement target, which is similar to the 37.02% average reduction predicted when the regulator 
has unbiased information on costs. The inflation coefficient of 1.075 selected by the regulator 
using biased cost information would lead to an expected abatement of 39.49% (just below the 
39.89% expected abatement under unbiased cost information). Thus, the inflation coefficient of 
1.075 appears to be reasonably invariant both to the target abatement and to the quality of cost 
information available to the regulator. 
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Using a similar approach, a regulator who can simulate trading outcomes and choose to 
evaluate the likely range of non-attainment from a trading program, and can empirically select 
the total points inflation coefficient, can (at least approximately) correct the bias. Of course, we 
do have to keep in mind that the actual abatement realization is going to be subject to the 
stochastic influences of weather, climate, and possibly other factors, and that those influences 
may swamp the small non-attainment bias of the trading program. The attractive feature of the 
trading program however, is that regardless of the actual ex-post abatement observed, that level 
of abatement was carried out at the lowest possible cost.  
 
Policy Implications, Extensions, and Conclusions 
We evaluated three simple regulatory approaches to agricultural nonpoint-source water 
pollution control: the CAC, the on-farm performance standard (PS), and a trading system based 
on abatement action credits. We consider these approaches under three scenarios regarding 
regulator’s information on the true costs of abatement actions. As a benchmark and a completely 
unrealistic scenario, we consider the case of perfect information on costs. The unsurprising 
message is that in this situation, the regulator should use that information to her advantage and, 
as a result, can formulate cost-efficient policies regardless of the approach adopted. For the more 
realistic scenario of the regulator having some, but imperfect, cost information, we argue that the 
regulator can do well by utilizing this information prior to implementing a CAC or a PS 
program, but the regulator does not benefit from such information under a trading program.27 
From a different angle the interpretation is, when political or secondary environmental 
considerations preclude a trading program from being implemented, it may very well be worth it 
for the regulator to engage in an effort to inform herself about the likely costs of abatement 
actions, and to use that information in designing the program.28 
                                                            
27 Except to use this information to simulate likely outcomes of the trading program to find a good empirical 
approximation to the inflation factor k.  
28 There exists a set of theoretical results that suggest that an optimal trading ratio in a trading program under 
uncertainty depends on the quantities evaluated at the optimal solution (Shortle and Horan, 2008; Rabotyagov and 
Feng, 2010; Yates and Rigby, 2012). These are discouraging results for the proponents of water quality trading, 
since if costs are known (to solve for the optimum), no trading is necessary. We originally expected that such results 
may find empirical support in this application (e.g., via the trading program structured around point coefficients 
estimated from the optimal frontier performing better than a trading program utilizing approximations from random 
SWAT model draws). We do not find it to be the case.  
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In the proposed PS and trading programs, we consider a procedure to approximate a 
complex and nonlinear water quality production function in order to linearize the process, and to 
make abatement actions across farms independent of each other in order to capitalize on 
individual optimizing behavior. We affirm the good cost-efficiency properties of a trading 
program, although we find that setting the total points value (akin to choosing a cap in a cap-and-
trade program) may require correcting the approximation bias. However, we argue that by 
employing the abatement action tradable credit system described in this work, we can transform 
the complex nonpoint-source pollution problem into one where a simple market in one freely 
tradable commodity (abatement point credit) can be implemented, with all the attractive cost-
efficiency properties known since Montgomery (1972).  
The point-credit approximation procedure can also be adapted to (a) extend the market to 
multiple pollutants (using either a single point system where the regulator seeks to achieve a 
specific point in abatement space, or a system with separate point markets for different 
pollutants), (b) to bring cropping choices into the point credit system (Collentine and Johnsson, 
2012), (c) to create sub-watershed-scale markets, or (d) to modify the market for stochastic 
weather and climate factors to try to build in some kind of “margin of safety,” or “safety-first,” 
considerations. For example, echoing the approach suggested by Shortle and Horan (2006), 
where trading in nonpoint-source pollution happens in multiple markets, and where one market 
focuses on the mean and other markets focus on higher moments of pollution distribution, we 
can envision a related “safety-first” points market. To estimate those points, one would simulate 
a large number of possible watershed configurations for a sufficiently long simulation period, 
encompassing most of the likely weather realizations. Then, the share of simulation years where 
water quality target is reached would serve as an estimate of reliability of reductions, and would 
subsequently be used in constructing the “risk-modified” set of points. We leave these extensions 
to future work. 
Many caveats regarding the water quality modeling process, data availability, uncertainty 
over the changing climate and hydrologic regimes, and monitoring and compliance issues apply. 
The approaches presented are necessarily simplified compared to any actual watershed programs. 
We believe, however, that these should not serve as an impediment to more thorough 
consideration of the proposed flexible approaches by the research community, and perhaps 
warrant a serious look for possible implementation by watershed managers.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Summary of cases considered. 
Familiar and convenient 
theoretical territory, but not the 
best representation of water 
quality production function 
More realistic, but more difficult, water 
quality production function, and possible 
“workarounds” to create an incentive-
based system:  
Pollution process  
 
 
 
 
Availability of 
cost information   
Linear, separable:  
 
ܣሺݎሻ ൌ ෍݀௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ
ே
௜
 
Environmental goal reached by 
construction in any regulatory 
system 
Nonlinear, nonseparable: 
 
ܣሺݎሻ ൌ ܣሺݎଵሺݔଵሻ, ݎଶሺݔଶሻ, … , ݎேሺݔேሻሻ 
 
Environmental goal is not guaranteed to be 
reached in all cases 
Form of market 
trading system  
min௫ೕ,௟೔∈௑ ܥ௜௉ሺݔ௜, ሻ ൅ ݌݈௜    
s. ݐ.			݀௜	ݎ௜൫ݔ௝, ߠ௜൯ ൅ ݈௜ ൒ 	 ݈పഥ଴ and 
the market clearing condition 
∑ ݈௜ ൌ 0௜   
min௫ೕ,௟೔∈௑ ܥ௜௉ሺݔ௜, ሻ ൅ ݌݈௜    
s. ݐ.				݀௜ᇱݎ௜൫ݔ௝, ߠ௜൯ ൅ ݈௜ ൒ 	 ݈పഥ଴ and the market 
clearing condition ∑ ݈௜ ൌ 0௜   
Where ݀௜ᇱ and ݈పഥ଴vectors are created using 
the water quality model simulation and/or 
optimization results  
Perfect 
information 
CASE 1: 
 
Ease of solution: Easily solve for 
the optimal allocation of 
abatement effort 
 
CAC at the farm level: first-best 
 
Performance standard: first-best 
 
Market: first-best 
CASE 4: 
 
Ease of solution: Not easy, but can (using 
OR techniques, evolutionary algorithms, 
etc.) solve for first-best 
CAC at the farm level: 
On-farm target: first-best 
Water quality goal: attained 
 
Performance standard: second-best (but may 
be close to first-best) if in the form of ݀௜∗ݎ௜∗, 
where ݀௜∗’s are based on the linearization of 
A(r) Water quality goal: attained 
 
Market: second-best (even if based on ݀௜∗’s 
at the optimum), water quality goal may 
not be attained  
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Some 
information 
(e.g., unbiased 
estimate of the 
mean) 
CASE 2: 
 
Ease of solution: easy, but 
second-best 
 
CAC at the farm level:  
On-farm: second-best 
Ambient: second-best 
 
Market: first-best 
CASE 5: 
Can solve the cost-minimization problem 
(second-best) 
CAC at the farm level: 
On-farm: second-best 
Water quality goal: attained 
 
Ambient: second-best 
Water quality goal: may not be attained 
 
Market: second-best (but cost savings may 
be possible), water quality goal may not be 
attained 
No information CASE 3: 
 
Ease of solution: no solution on 
cost-efficient allocation of effort 
 
CAC (“satisficing approach”): 
“third-best” for both on-farm and 
ambient targets (any allocation 
ݎ௣ s.t. ܣ൫ݎ௣൯ ൌ ∑ ݀௜ݎ௣௜௜ ൌ ̅ܣ) 
 
PS-satisficing approach (require 
݀௜ݎ௣௜ on-farm) : second-best—
more efficient than CAC 
 
Trading program: first-best 
(Montgomery) 
CASE 6: 
 
Cannot solve the cost-minimization 
problem. 
 
CAC: “third-best”, water quality goal 
reached (any allocation ݎ௣ s.t. ܣ൫ݎ௣൯ ൌ ̅ܣ) 
 
Performance standard cannot be specified 
 
Trading program: delivery coefficients 
derived at the arbitrary (e.g., baseline), r: 
ܣሺݎሻ ≅ ∑ ݀௜ᇱሺݎ௜଴ሻݎ௜ே௜ୀଵ .  
second-best, water quality goal may not be 
reached 
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Table 2. Mutually exclusive conservation practice combinations.  
 Conservation  Practice Conservation practice description 
1 Baseline The baseline existent agriculture practices 
2 No till (NT) No till, no more than 30% of crop residue is removed. 
3 Reduced Fertilizer (RF) Reducing fertilizer application rate by 20%. 
4 Cover Crops (CCr) Establishment of cover crops between crop rotations. 
5 Land retirement (CRP) Retirement of land from production 
6 NT RF No till, no more than 30% of crop residue is removed. 
7 NT CCr No till and 20% reduction in nitrogen application rate. 
8 RF CCr No till and establishment of cover crops. 
9 NT RF CCr No till, 20% reduction in N application rate and cover crops. 
 
  
 
 
Table 3. Estimated point values coefficients by subbasin (with standard errors from estimation and the overall fit statistic) 
 Abatement practices 
Location No till Cover crops No till, Cover Crops Red.fertilizer Red.Fert, No till 
Red.Fert., Cover 
Crops Red.Fert., No till, CC CRP 
Subbasin1 3.441 (7.295)*** 1.872 (3.918)*** 5.355 (11.153)*** 0.213 (0.449) 4.507 (9.630)*** 2.692 (5.730)*** 6.153 (13.285)*** 10.263 (21.263)*** 
Subbasin2 3.959 (8.813)*** 2.419 (5.259)*** 5.342 (11.956)*** 0.73 (1.619) 4.489 (9.914)*** 2.481 (5.362)*** 5.918 (13.106)*** 9.561 (20.586)*** 
Subbasin3 3.541 (7.496)*** 1.897 (4.071)*** 4.585 (10.022)*** 0.318 (0.682) 3.867 (8.486)*** 2.56 (5.565)*** 4.845 (10.455)*** 7.498 (16.072)*** 
Subbasin4 2.501 (2.780)** 2.818 (3.130)** 4.522 (5.024)*** 0.328 (0.352) 3.834 (4.208)*** 2.065 (2.268)** 4.161 (4.547)*** 5.842 (6.336)*** 
Subbasin5 2.036 (7.289)*** 1.985 (7.116)*** 3.976 (14.305)*** 0.621 (2.194)** 2.612 (9.515)*** 2.499 (9.139)*** 4.709 (16.638)*** 6.428 (22.779)*** 
Subbasin6 2.238 (6.187)*** 2.153 (5.972)*** 4.441 (12.421)*** 0.734 (2.024)** 2.449 (6.813)*** 2.91 (7.924)*** 5.048 (13.968)*** 7.007 (19.372)*** 
Subbasin7 6.339 (6.617)*** 3.315 (3.370)** 6.514 (6.737)*** 1.285 (1.3) 6.596 (6.757)*** 3.265 (3.347)** 7.798 (8.135)*** 10.125 (10.451)*** 
Subbasin8 2.838 (5.292)*** 3.144 (5.835)*** 5.198 (9.623)*** 0.759 (1.368) 3.866 (7.228)*** 3.185 (5.835)*** 5.161 (9.724)*** 7.459 (13.648)*** 
Subbasin9 0.872 (3.303)** 1.037 (3.951)*** 2.005 (7.41)*** 0.344 (1.297) 1.071 (4.021)*** 1.78 (6.732)*** 2.339 (8.706)*** 4.331 (15.977)*** 
Subbasin10 1.678 (4.679)*** 2.316 (6.439)*** 2.992 (8.397)*** 0.504 (1.439) 2.233 (6.492)*** 2.701 (7.554)*** 4.481 (12.732)*** 5.911 (16.445)*** 
Subbasin11 2.092 (4.472)*** 1.819 (3.799)*** 3.412 (7.083)*** 0.144 (0.302) 3.219 (6.780)*** 2.847 (6.004)*** 5.344 (11.233)*** 7.314 (15.442)*** 
Subbasin12 2.927 (7.471)*** 2.312 (5.876)*** 4.027 (10.065)*** 0.02 (0.051) 3.225 (8.365)*** 2.953 (7.458)*** 5.115 (12.953)*** 6.957 (17.994)*** 
Subbasin13 2.166 (7.249)*** 2.472 (8.439)*** 3.53 (11.838)*** 0.276 (0.934) 2.336 (7.779)*** 2.455 (8.266)*** 3.413 (11.513)*** 5.83 (19.509)*** 
Subbasin14 2.041 (4.397)*** 2.043 (4.361)*** 3.239 (7.126)*** 1.003 (2.134)** 2.529 (5.377)*** 3.188 (6.764)*** 3.976 (8.543)*** 5.656 (12.015)*** 
Subbasin15 2.368 (6.689)*** 1.687 (4.769)*** 3.96 (11.097)*** 0.097 (0.276) 2.683 (7.643)*** 1.73 (4.998)*** 3.847 (10.633)*** 5.101 (14.538)*** 
Subbasin16 1.056 (3.370)** 1.125 (3.586)*** 2.458 (8.122)*** 0.242 (0.783) 1.559 (5.055)*** 1.525 (5.003)*** 2.763 (8.966)*** 3.886 (12.581)*** 
Subbasin17 1.765 (4.370)*** 1.897 (4.679)*** 3.242 (7.874)*** 1.021 (2.505)** 2.064 (5.108)*** 2.46 (6.033)*** 3.577 (8.742)*** 4.443 (10.905)*** 
Subbasin18 2.905 (6.200)*** 3.097 (6.473)*** 4.099 (8.881)*** 1.507 (3.177)** 3.443 (7.503)*** 3.447 (7.562)*** 4.831 (10.251)*** 7.148 (15.57)*** 
Subbasin19 3.355 (4.789)*** 1.962 (2.819)** 4.821 (6.883)*** 0.001 (0.001) 3.026 (4.267)*** 2.766 (3.987)*** 4.775 (6.775)*** 7.451 (10.655)*** 
Subbasin20 1.909 (5.176)*** 2.593 (7.095)*** 4.279 (11.825)*** 0.859 (2.301)** 2.738 (7.339)*** 2.513 (6.716)*** 4.493 (11.997)*** 6.594 (17.705)*** 
Subbasin21 4.133 (15.85)*** 2.834 (10.529)*** 6.714 (25.702)*** 0.922 (3.450)** 4.927 (18.418)*** 3.587 (13.565)*** 7.007 (26.46)*** 12.188 (45.724)*** 
Subbasin22 2.321 (4.348)*** 3.114 (5.943)*** 4.386 (8.145)*** 0.597 (1.145) 3.682 (6.990)*** 3.5 (6.770)*** 5.35 (10.086)*** 8.49 (15.875)*** 
Subbasin23 2.59 (4.181)*** 3.07 (4.942)*** 4.422 (7.020)*** 0.434 (0.706) 3.647 (5.857)*** 3.493 (5.564)*** 5.768 (8.989)*** 7.894 (12.489)*** 
Subbasin24 2.151 (4.659)*** 2.057 (4.588)*** 4.361 (9.587)*** 0.842 (1.878)* 3.468 (7.611)*** 3.07 (6.809)*** 4.742 (10.263)*** 7.772 (17.112)*** 
Subbasin25 1.534 (2.688)** 1.663 (2.936)** 4.519 (7.993)*** 0.169 (0.295) 2.515 (4.446)*** 1.862 (3.248)** 4.194 (7.526)*** 6.651 (11.771)*** 
Subbasin26 3.33 (4.594)*** 3.737 (5.057)*** 8.12 (11.185)*** 0.66 (0.874) 5.569 (7.636)*** 4.77 (6.579)*** 7.337 (9.927)*** 12.689 (17.399)*** 
Subbasin27 5.527 (2.490)** 5.055 (2.286)** 9.192 (4.147)*** 1.468 (0.642) 3.934 (1.769)* 3.186 (1.41) 9.116 (4.132)*** 12.18 (5.481)*** 
Subbasin28 2.032 (4.108)*** 2.105 (4.313)*** 4.364 (8.639)*** 0.001 (0.002) 2.638 (5.351)*** 1.879 (3.874)*** 3.886 (7.888)*** 5.509 (11.311)*** 
Subbasin29 3.482 (4.651)*** 2.692 (3.503)*** 4.546 (5.946)*** 0.501 (0.659) 3.72 (4.98)*** 4.116 (5.564)*** 5.229 (6.804)*** 9.28 (12.465)*** 
Subbasin30 3.757 (6.583)*** 2.198 (3.947)*** 5.367 (9.377)*** 1.241 (2.175)** 3.619 (6.492)*** 3.403 (6.062)*** 5.508 (9.535)*** 8.269 (14.585)*** 
* p<=0.1 ** p<.=001  ** p <=0.05 * p<=0.1 R_square 0.993 
  
 
 
 
Table 4. Simulated program performance under varying N abatement goals.  
Target N 
reduction, 
% from 
baseline 
Approximately 
optimal solution 
(AC optimizing 
approach) CAC, satisficing approach PS, satisficing approach PS, optimizing approach 
Trading, satisficing 
approach 
 
Total point values 
20%--974,626 
30%--1,419,642 
40%--1,864,908 
Trading, optimizing 
approach 
 
Total point values 
20%--963,658 
30%--1,401,848 
40%--1,868,107 
 N red. $ N red. 
$, 
million
Dominated 
by N red.
$, 
million
Dominated 
by N red. 
$, 
million 
Dominated 
by N red.
$, 
million
Dominated 
by N red.
$, 
million 
Dominated 
by 
20 20.73 1.8 20.86 
 
7.2 
 
164 22.19
 
5.0 
 
95 
 
20.85 
 
1.7 
 
0 17.29 
 
1.2 
 
0 17.03 
 
1.2 
 
0 
30 30.12 3.2 30.12 
 
19.8 
 
435 
 
31.23
 
17.8 
 
379 
 
30.18 
 
3.1 
 
0 27.80 
 
2.3 
 
0 28.58 
 
2.4 
 
0 
40 40.00 9.0 40.00 29.6 
 
323 40.83
 
28.0 
 
305 39.67 
 
8.7 
 
0 36.13 
 
6.7 
 
1 36.21 
 
6.7 
 
2 
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Table 5. Simulated outcomes under cost heterogeneity. 
Command and Control and Performance Standard  Outcomes, 20% goal 
                               PS, optimizing 
CAC, 
optimizing 
(20.73% N 
red.) PS, satisficing 
CAC, 
satisficing 
(20.86% N 
red.) 
  Cost, $/yr 
N, % 
red. Cost, $/yr Cost, $/yr N, % red. Cost, $/yr 
Mean 1,665,199 20.85 1,793,057 4,950,564 22.30 7,231,175 
Max 1,820,648 20.86 1,955,425 5,483,399 22.52 7,828,026 
Min 1,540,891 20.83 1,663,784 4,392,286 22.07 6,665,245 
StdDev 38,090 0.01 38,705 184,403 0.07 200,556 
Trading Outcomes, 20% goal 
Optimizing P  Satisficing P Psatisficing*(K =1.075)  
  Cost, $/yr 
N, % 
red. Cost, $/yr N, % red. Cost, $/yr N, % red. 
Mean 927,373 17.68 950,499 17.92 1,113,597 19.45 
Max 1,026,921 18.91 1,051,417 19.05 1,222,170 20.72 
Min 839,141 16.65 861,319 16.97 1,012,692 18.43 
StdDev 29,253 0.30 29,583 0.30 31,850 0.28 
 
Command and Control and Performance Standard  Outcomes, 30% goal 
 PS, optimizing 
CAC, 
optimizing 
(30.12% N 
red.) PS, satisficing 
CAC, 
satisficing 
(30.12% N 
red.) 
  Cost, $/yr 
N, % 
red.  Cost, $/yr Cost, $/yr N, % red. Cost, $/yr 
Mean 3,081,106 30.32 3,232,261 17,814,415 30.32 19,804,107
Min 3,240,390 30.60 3,002,472 15,857,322 30.60 21,643,385
Max 2,863,244 30.14 3,386,230 19,640,986 30.14 17,831,074
StdDev 60,465 0.07 59,303 644,392 0.07 645,923
Trading Outcomes, 30% goal 
Optimizing P Satisficing P Psatisficing*(K =1.075) 
  Cost, $/yr 
N, % 
red. Cost, $/yr N, % red. Cost, $/yr N, % red. 
Mean 2,260,722 27.92 2,188,889 27.51 2,653,474 29.89 
Max 2,422,324 28.50 2,347,530 28.15 2,846,200 30.38 
Min 2,103,920 27.42 2,035,468 26.97 2,468,987 29.39 
StdDev 48,061 0.18 46,943 0.19 56,049 0.16 
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Table 5. Continued  
Command and Control and Performance Standard  Outcomes, 40% goal 
PS, optimizing 
CAC, 
optimizing 
(40.00% N 
red.) PS, satisficing 
CAC, 
satisficing 
(40.00% N 
red.) 
Cost, 
$/yr 
N, % 
red. Cost, $/yr Cost, $/yr N, % red. Cost, $/yr 
Mean 8,654,175 39.93 9,010,815 27,910,009 40.92 29,573,330
Max 9,212,053 40.18 9,572,124 30,669,551 41.14 32,318,543
Min 8,139,097 39.74 8,507,064 24,773,870 40.74 26,419,302
StdDev 163,169 0.07 162,446 897,480 1.30 900,772
Trading Outcomes, 40% goal 
Optimizing P Satisficing P Psatisficing*(K =1.075) 
Cost, 
$/yr 
N, % 
red. Cost, $/yr N, % red. Cost, $/yr N, % red. 
Mean 5,382,613 37.09 5,350,838 37.02 6,907,911 39.89 
Max 5,859,830 37.80 5,823,730 37.79 7,554,883 40.62 
Min 5,004,844 36.51 4,975,517 36.46 6,372,985 39.19 
StdDev 123,255 0.20 122,218 0.20 166,865 0.22 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. US waters assessed as impaired 
Source: EPA National Summary of Assessed Waters Report 2002,2004,2006,2008,2010 
 
 
Figure 2. Total abatement cost curve (tradeoff frontier) 
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Figure 3. Simulated program outcomes under cost heterogeneity, 20% N abatement goal 
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Figure 4. Simulated program outcomes under cost heterogeneity, 30% N abatement goal 
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Figure 5. Simulated program outcomes under cost heterogeneity, 40% N abatement goal 
  
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
36 36.5 37 37.5 38 38.5 39 39.5 40 40.5 41 41.5 42
Co
st
 ($
1,
00
0)
N% reduction 
Abatement 40%
Target, optimizing CAC, optimizing Target, satisficing
CAC, satisficing PS, optimizing PS, satisficing
Trading, optimizing Trading, satisficing Trading, satisficing (K=1.075)
42 
 
APPENDIX 
1. Equivalence of the trading program outcome to the social planner’s cost-minimization 
outcome.  
Social planner’s problem: 
TC ൌ min௫೔ೕ, ෍෍ܿ௜௝ݔ௜௝
௃
௝
ே
௜
 
 
s.t                     
  
෍෍ܽ௜௝ ∗ ݔ௜௝
௃
௝
൒ ෍ܽపഥ
ே
௜
ே
௜
∗ ݏ௜				
 
 
ܮ ൌ ෍෍ܿ௜௝ݔ௜௝
௃
௝
ே
௜
െ ߣሺ෍෍ܽ௜௝ ∗ ݔ௜௝
௃
௝
െ෍ܽపഥ
ே
௜
ே
௜
∗ ݏ௜ሻ 
First order conditions 
ݔ௜௝ 	 ∶ 															 ܿ௜௝ െ ߣܽ௜௝ ൒ 0								ݔ௜௝ ൒ 0				ݔ௜௝൫ܿ௜௝ െ ߣܽ௜௝൯ ൌ 0	
 
Trading program: cost minimization at farm level. Farmers minimize the abatement costs by 
choosing the amount of land allocated to each abatement practice, and by buying or selling 
abatement points such that to satisfy the field constraint.  
TC୧ ൌ min௫೔ೕ,௕೔ ෍ܿ௜௝ݔ௜௝
௃
௝
൅ ݌ܾ௜ 
 
s.t       
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෍ܽ௜௝ ∗ ݔ௜௝ ൅
௃
௝
ܾ௜ ൒ ܽపഥݏ௜
 
 
ܮ ൌ 	෍ܿ௜௝ݔ௜௝
௃
௝
െ ݌ܾ௜ െ ߤ௜ሺ෍ܽ௜௝ ∗ ݔ௜௝ 		൅
௃
௝
	ܾ௜ െ ܽపഥݏ௜ሻ 
ݔ௜௝ 	 ∶ 															 ܿ௜௝ െ ߤ௜	ܽ௜௝ ൒ 0								ݔ௜௝ ൒ 0				ݔ௜௝൫ܿ௜௝ െ ߤ௜ܽ௜௝൯ ൌ 0 
ܾ௜ 	 ∶ 												݌ െ		ߤ௜ ൒ 0								ܾ௜ ൒ 0				ܾ௜ሺ݌ െ		ߤ௜ሻ ൌ 0	
 
Second equation implies      ݌ ൌ 		 ߤ௜ 
Replacing in the first equation    ܿ௜௝ െ ݌	ܽ௜௝ ൒ 0	 and comparing with the problem above we 
obtain  ݌ ൌ 		ߣ. 
Under trading, the market clearing condition is  ∑ܾ௜ ൌ 0  but   	ܾ௜ ൌ ܽపഥݏ௜ െ ∑ ܽ௜௝ ∗ ݔ௜௝		௃௝  
෍ሼܽపതതതതݏ௜ െ෍ܽ௜௝ ∗ ݔ௜௝		
௃
௝
ሽ
௜
ൌ 0 
 
෍ܽపഥݏ௜
௜
െ෍෍ܽ௜௝ ∗ ݔ௜௝		
௃
௝௜
ൌ 0 
෍෍ܽ௜௝ ∗ ݔ௜௝		
௃
௝௜
ൌ ෍ܽపഥݏ௜
௜
ൌ ܣ 
 
Hence the equivalence of the two problems. 
Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to outcomes presented in Table 4 
Figure A1. Distribution of reductions, 20% N abatement goal. 
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Figure A1. Distribution of reductions, 20% N abatement goal. 
 
 
Figure A2. Distribution of reductions, 30% N abatement goal. 
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Figure A3. Distribution of reductions, 40% N abatement goal. 
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